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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LEANNA BROADWATER,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Case No. 900508
vs.
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY, a Wisconsin
corporation doing business in
Utah, NORTHWESTERN NATIONAL
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and SCOTT J. FLETCHER, a Utah
resident,

Priority No. 16

Defendants-Appellants.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In determining the proper measure of damages for converted
goods with a widely fluctuating market value, Utah courts have
adopted the "New York rule." Under the New York rule, damages are
fixed at the highest market price the converted good reach at any
time

between

the time the

injured

party

has notice

of the

conversion and a "reasonable time" thereafter. The trial court in
this case committed error in ruling as a matter of law that 90 days
constituted a reasonable time in which to fix plaintiff's damages
under the facts of this case.
Plaintiff relies on an assortment of irrelevant facts to
support her assertion that she should be allowed at least 90 days
from notice of the conversion of her stock to have her damages
1

fixed.

For purposes of the cross motions for partial summary

judgment, defendants assumed, arguendo, the following critical
undisputed facts:
1.

On or about May 4, 1988, plaintifffs stock was converted;

2.

The act of conversion was committed by defendants Atlas

and Check Rite; and
3.

Plaintiff had notice of the conversion of her stock on or

about May 4, 1988.
Many of the facts relied upon by plaintiff in her motion for
partial summary judgment were either in dispute or were immaterial
to the fixing of her damages, if any, proximately caused by the
conversion of plaintiff's stock by defendants Atlas and Check Rite.
Under the undisputed material facts of this case, plaintiff, as a
matter of law, should be given no more than 30 days to either have
mitigated her damages by purchasing replacement shares or have her
damages fixed at that point in time in accordance with the under
the New York rule.
Defendants properly raised several evidentiary objections to
the affidavits submitted by plaintiff in support of her cross
motion

for partial summary judgment.

Since the trial court

improperly refused to strike certain portions of the affidavits of
plaintiff, Chuck Burton, Potter Investment, and Penny Grace, the
trial court's ruling granting partial summary judgment in favor of
plaintiff based upon those affidavits should be reversed.

2

Plaintiff asserts that the trial court's award of attorney's
fees should be affirmed because they were awarded as consequential
damages, rather than as sanctions under Utah Code Ann. § 7 8-27-56.
Well-established
attorney's

Utah

fees may

law

provides

not be awarded

that

as

absent

a

general

rule,

a contractual or

statutory basis therefor. The "third-party tort rule," adopted in
South Sanpitch Co. v. Pack, 765 P.2d 1279 (Utah Ct. App. 1988),
does not support the award of attorney's fees in this case.
Plaintiff's amended complaint claimed that she was only entitled to
an award of attorney's fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.
Since the trial court made no specific findings of fact, as
required under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, this court should reverse
the trial court's award of attorney's fees.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES, AS A MATTER OF LAW, MUST
BE FIXED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE
OF THE ACT OF CONVERSION*
Although

plaintiff

correctly

points

out

that

other

jurisdictions have adopted varying rules for measuring damages for
the conversion of goods with widely fluctuating values, the Utah
Supreme Court adopted the "New York rule" in Western Securities Co.
v. Silver King Consolidated Mining Co., 57 Utah 88, 192 P. 664
(1920).

Under the New York rule, a party is entitled only to

recover the highest value her stock reached within a "reasonable
time" of her learning of the conversion of her stock.

3

Since the

adoption of the New York rule by the Utah Supreme Court in Western
Securities, no Utah appellate court has questioned the continued
viability of the New York rule as the proper test for fixing
damages in a case such as the instant case. Furthermore, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals
Talbott, 247 F.2d

771

in Nephi Processing Plant, Inc. v.

(10th Cir. 1957), also recognized the

continued viability of the New York rule in Utah.
Plaintiff admits that the numerous cases cited by defendants
in their initial brief establish that time periods of 30 days or
less may be considered "a reasonable time11 for fixing damages under
the New York rule. However, plaintiff points to several "facts" in
support of her claims that the New York rule is either inapplicable
or that she should be allowed at least 90 days from her notice of
defendants1 conversion to have her damages fixed.
Plaintiff first asserts that the trial court's ruling should
be affirmed because the defendants knowingly and intentionally
converted her stock.

Defendants respectfully point out that the

tort of conversion, such as is alleged in counts I and II of
plaintiff's

amended

complaint, is by

its very

definition an

intentional tort. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222A (1965)
defines conversion as:
(1)

Conversion is an intentional exercise of
dominion or control over a chattel which
so seriously interferes with the right
of another to control it that the actormay justly be required to pay the other
the full value of the chattel.

4

The authors of the Restatement of Torts further clearly provided
that conversion cannot be committed through mere negligence:
One who does not intentionally exercise
dominion or control over a chattel is not
liable for a conversion even though his act or
omission is negligent.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 224 (1965).
always

an

intentional

Since conversion is

tort, the distinction

which

plaintiff

attempts to draw between this case and those cited by defendants is
a distinction without a difference.
Plaintiff next asserts that her damages should be fixed 90
days after she learned of the conversion because the defendants
failed to immediately remedy the conversion despite their knowledge
that her stock was increasing in value. Such factors were present
in each of the cases cited by defendants in their initial brief.
Since each of the cited cases involved a conversion by one with a
general working knowledge of the securities market, it can be
safely assumed that all such tortfeasors know that the value of
converted stock might fluctuate. Furthermore, it should be pointed
out that plaintiff's affidavits, at most, establish that Old
Republic knew that the Check Rite stock was likely to fluctuate in
value.

It is undisputed

that Old Republic did not convert

plaintiff's stock. As a result, any knowledge held by Old Republic
concerning

the

fluctuating

value

of

Check

Rite's

stock

is

irrelevant to the application of the New York rule in this case.
Plaintiff also asserts that this case is distinguishable from
those cited in defendants' initial brief because this case involves
5

a surety bond. The presence or absence of a lost instruments bond
is irrelevant to an action brought by the rightful holder of a
stock

certificate

against

a party

holder's stock certificate.

accused

of converting

the

Although Old Republic, through its

predecessor in interest, issued a lost instruments bond on behalf
of defendants Scott Fletcher, Atlas and Check Rite, the subject
bond in no way excuses plaintiff's duty to mitigate her damages nor
obviates the applicability of the New York rule in this case.
In addition, plaintiff asserts that the New York rule is
inapplicable because plaintiff's stock was not converted in a "sale
in the market" of her stock.

The critical issue in this case is

not the manner in which the act of conversion was committed by
several of the defendants, but rather that a conversion of goods
having a widely fluctuating value occurred.

The fact that Check

Rite shares are not traded on the New York Stock Exchange and that
the shares were not converted in some type of a transactional
purchase or sale is irrelevant to the determination of what
constitutes a reasonable time in which to fix plaintiff's damages
under the New York rule.
Finally, plaintiff asserts that she should be permitted at
least 90 days in which to have her damages fixed since she had no
subjective intent and no resources to go into the open marketplace
to purchase replacement shares. The law places a duty to mitigate
upon every injured party.

An aggrieved party's subjective intent

or inability to mitigate should not be controlling factors in

6

determining when damages should be fixed in a case where goods with
a widely fluctuating value have been converted.

Indeed, the New

York rule has been carefully crafted to obviate the need to refer
to the injured party's subjective intent or ability to purchase
replacement shares.
Defendants respectfully submit that plaintiff should not be
allowed to rely upon alleged "lulling" and "stalling" activities of
a third party, such as Old Republic, which did not participate in
the act of conversion in order to recover higher damages against
those parties which converted plaintiff's stock. The only conduct
in this case which is relevant to the determination of when to fix
plaintiff's damages is the conduct engaged in by defendants Atlas
and Check Rite in allegedly failing to transfer plaintiff's shares
on or about May 4, 1988.

Since plaintiff had knowledge of the

conversion on or about May 4, 1988, her damages should be fixed
within a "reasonable time" thereafter. Defendants submit that the
trial court erred in failing to hold that 30 days constitutes a
reasonable time in which to fix plaintiff's damages under the New
York rule.
POINT II.
THE AFFIDAVITS UPON WHICH PLAINTIFF RELIED IN
HER CROSS MOTION OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD
HAVE BEEN STRICKEN•
Plaintiff asserts that defendants' motion to strike portions
of the affidavits of plaintiff, Chuck Burton, Potter Investment,
and Penny Grace, was properly denied because defendants failed to

7

indicate why said affidavits were objectionable.

At the time of

the hearing for the cross motions for partial summary judgment,
defendants

submitted

a written memorandum

detailing why said

affidavits failed to comport with Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P.

(R. 428-

431) Although Judge Uno did not allow oral argument on defendants1
motion to strike, counsel specifically requested that Judge Uno
take into consideration the pending motion to strike when ruling on
the parties' cross motions for partial summary judgment.

(R. 646)

Plaintiff's affidavit of February 13, 1990, contains facts not
supported by adequate foundation and impermissible opinion and
legal conclusions drawn by a layman.

(R. 389-392)

In paragraph 2

of her affidavit, plaintiff impermissibly concludes that she was
"mistreated, misled, and lulled" by certain of the defendants. In
paragraph 3, plaintiff speculates "that she would have received the
highest price that such stock reached in 1988."

In paragraph 4,

plaintiff opines that she "believes that the defendants . . . had
a duty to make her whole." Paragraph 5 of the affidavit is replete
with unsubstantiated

facts and opinions.

Paragraph 6 of the

affidavit contains impermissible opinions and legal conclusions
concerning plaintiff's duty to mitigate.
Plaintiff's

second

affidavit,

which

was

submitted

in

opposition to defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, is
likewise defective.

(R. 413-416) In fact, this affidavit consists

of nothing more than legal argument of counsel put in the form of
an affidavit signed by the plaintiff. The affidavit deals with the

8

parties' respective duties under the law and the plaintiff's own
opinions that she acted reasonably and that the defendants did not.
The affidavit of Chuck Burton sets forth hearsay evidence of
what plaintiff

allegedly

told

Mr. Burton during

a telephone

conversation in July, 1988. (R. 379-80) Furthermore, Mr. Burton's
affidavit lacks any foundation concerning the alleged transaction
involving Check Rite stock referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 of his
affidavit. Mr. Burton's affidavit also fails to clearly set forth
the foundational basis for which he claims to have personal
knowledge of said transaction.
The affidavit of George Potter on behalf of Potter Investment
Company was likewise defective.

(R. 381-83)

Mr. Potter opines

without foundation in paragraph 2 of his affidavit that Check Rite
stock certificate No. 258 had been properly endorsed by defendant
Scott

Fletcher

and

that

plaintiff

consideration for said shares of stock.

had

tendered

valuable

Such factual assertions

also amount to impermissible legal conclusions. Paragraph 3 of Mr.
Potter's affidavit likewise contains hearsay evidence and lacks
sufficient foundation for the introduction of the facts set forth
therein.
Finally, the affidavit of Penny Grace fails to set forth that
she is authorized on behalf of the Thomson McKinnon Securities
Company to render the affidavit.

(R. 387-388)

Likewise, Ms.

Grace's affidavit fails to set forth any evidence of the price at
which Check Rite stock could be sold.

9

In addition, evidence as to

the price Ms. Grace was required to pay for Check Rite stock is
irrelevant to the issues in this case.
In view of the deficiencies in the affidavits submitted by
plaintiff in support of her cross motion for partial summary
judgment, the trial court should have stricken the affidavits in
conformity with Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P. Since the trial court granted
partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff in part based
upon the affidavits submitted by her, this court should reverse the
entry of partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiff.
POINT III.
DEFENDANTS1 ARGUMENT CONCERNING THE AWARD OP
ATTORNEY'S FEE WAS PROPERLY RAISED IN THE
COURT BELOW.
Plaintiff asserts that the defendants are claiming for the
first time on appeal that the attorney's fees awarded to her
constitute sanctions under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.

Plaintiff

asserts, without any support in the record, that the lower court
"based its award of attorney's fees on South Sanpitch Company v.
Pack, 765 P.2d 1279 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), and Nephi Processing
Plant,

Inc.

v.

Talbott,

247

F.2d

771

(Plaintiff's Opposing Brief at p. 23.)

(10th

Cir.

1957)."

Plaintiff's argument,

however, misses the mark.
Defendants have consistently maintained from the time the
trial court first considered the parties' cross motions for summary
judgment that Utah law does not permit attorney's fees to be

10

awarded to the prevailing party unless such fees are provided for
by contract or statute.

(R. 448)

Plaintiff's prayer for judgment against the various defendants
in her amended complaint states in pertinent part:
On counts I and II of Plaintiff's complaint,
Plaintiff
prays
for
judgment
against
defendants Atlas and Check Rite in the amount
of the highest price of the stock since May,
1988, an amount to be proven on or before
trial in which plaintiff calculates to be at
least $12,000, for costs, pre and postjudgment interest at the highest legal rate,
attorney's fees in accordance with § 78-27-56,
Utah Code Ann. , and otherwise, and for any all
further relief as the court deems fair and
equitable . . . .
The prayer of plaintiff's complaint clearly sets forth the sole
basis for plaintiff's claim for an award of attorney's fees in this
case.
Although plaintiff urged the trial court that South Sanpitch
Co. v. Pack and Nephi Processing Plant v. Talbott provide a basis
for

an

award

of

attorney's

fees

in

this

case,

defendants

respectfully submit that the cases do not support the award made by
the trial court in this case. In Nephi Processing Plant, there is
absolutely no mention or discussion of attorney's fees as an
element of damages.

In addition, the Nephi Processing Plant

opinion deals with the measure of damages in a case involving
breach of warranty.

In South Sanpitch Co., the Utah Supreme Court

affirmed the general rule that an award of attorney's fees is not
appropriate unless provided for by statute or contract, but created
a narrow exception commonly referred to as the "third-party tort

rule."

South Sanpitch Co., 765 P.2d at 1282-83.

The third-party

tort rule permits the recovery of attorney's fees as an element of
consequential

damages

"when the natural consequence of one's

negligence is another's involvement in a dispute with a third
party." icL at 1282. Under counts I and II of plaintiff's amended
complaint, plaintiff seeks direct recovery against defendants Atlas
and Check Rite for damages flowing from said defendants' alleged
intentional conduct.

In a direct action by one claiming that her

goods have been converted by the named defendants, the third-party
tort rule is inapplicable.
In view of the wording of the prayer of plaintiff's amended
complaint and the well-recognized general rule under Utah law,
there is absolutely no basis for the award of attorney's fees made
by the trial court in this case, unless the trial court intended to
award such fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-56.

However, the

record is silent as to the trial court's reasoning behind its award
of attorney's fees.

(R. 818-19)

In fact, the trial court's order

gives no indication, let alone specific findings, as to why the
court awarded attorney's fees in this case.

Due to the lack of

specific findings in the trial court's order and the apparent lack
of any basis for such an award, this court should find that the
trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees to plaintiff.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon foregoing, defendants respectfully request that
this court reverse the order granting partial summary judgment in
favor of plaintiff on counts I and II of her amended complaint and
order that the trial court grant defendantsf cross motion for
partial summary judgment on counts I and II. The defendants also
respectfully request that this court reverse or in the alternative
vacate and remand the trial court's order granting attorneyfs fees
to plaintiff.
DATED this ^0

day of

, 1991
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